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Abstract
Disparities in economic conditions among diﬀerent ethnic, racial, or religious groups continue to be
serious concerns in most economies. Relative standings of diﬀerent groups are rather persistent, although
some groups initially in disadvantaged positions successfully caught up with then-advantaged groups. Two
obstacles, costly skill investment and negative stereotypes or discrimination in the labor market, seem to
distort investment and sectoral choices, give rise to skill and labor market segregations by ethnicity, and slow
down the progress of disadvantaged groups.
How do these obstacles aﬀect skill investment and sectoral choices of diﬀerent groups and the dynamics of
their economic outcomes and inter-group inequality? Is aﬃrmative action necessary to signiﬁcantly improve
conditions of subordinate groups, or redistributive policies suﬃcient? In order to tackle these questions, this
paper develops a dynamic model of statistical discrimination and examines how initial economic standings
of groups and initial institutionalized discrimination aﬀect subsequent dynamics and long-run outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Disparities in economic conditions among diﬀerent ethnic, racial, or religious groups continue to be serious
concerns in most economies. Relative standings of diﬀerent groups are rather persistent (Borjas, 1994;
Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey, 2001),1 although some groups initially in disadvantaged positions successfully
caught up with then-dominant groups. Two obstacles seem to slow down the progress of subordinate groups.
One is costly skill investment: the quality of public schools is low in many countries, thus people expend on
supplementary study materials and tutoring, or attend high-quality but costly private schools (Baker et al.,
2001; Bray and Kwok, 2003).2 The other is negative stereotypes or discrimination in the labor market, which
compels many individuals of subordinate groups to invest less in skill, or to choose occupations or sectors
where performance is less aﬀected by such handicaps but earnings tend to be lower, such as informal-sector
jobs and neighborhood jobs (Telles, 1993; Bayard et al., 1999; van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001).3 Even
skilled people of the groups often avoid mainstream jobs and sectors and run small businesses instead.
How do these obstacles aﬀect skill investment and sectoral choices of diﬀerent groups and the dynamics of
their economic outcomes and inter-group inequality? Is aﬃrmative action necessary to signiﬁcantly improve
conditions of disadvantaged groups, or redistributive policies suﬃcient? In order to tackle these questions,
this paper develops a dynamic model of statistical discrimination and examines how initial economic stand-
ings of groups and initial institutionalized discrimination aﬀect subsequent dynamics.
The model. The analysis is based on a discrete-time small-open OLG model. There exists a continuum
of two-period-lived individuals who belong to one of two ethnic (racial, religious) groups. In childhood, an
individual receives a transfer from her parent and spends it on assets and skill investment needed to become
a skilled worker. No credit market exists for skill investment, so she cannot invest if the transfer is not
enough. Since she can spend wealth on assets too, she invests in skill only if it is aﬀordable and proﬁtable.
In adulthood, she chooses a sector to work (detailed next), obtains income from assets and work, and spends
it on consumption and a transfer to her single child.
1Borjas (1994) shows that wages of a U.S. worker in 1940 and 1980 are signiﬁcantly related to the average wage of immigrants
of the worker’s ethnic group in 1910, after individual characteristics are controlled for (blacks are not in the data). Darity,
Dietrich, and Guilkey (2001) ﬁnd that the occupational status of a U.S. worker in 1980 and 1990 is signiﬁcantly related to
human capital endowments and the degree of favorable or unfavorable treatment in the labor market in the period between
1880 and 1910 of his/her group.
2Baker et al. (2001) ﬁnd that about 40% of seven and eight graders in a large sample from 41 developed and developing
countries participate weekly in private supplementary tutoring, such as tutoring sessions and cram schools, to study mathe-
matics. Further, at the national level, they ﬁnd that the average participation rate is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the
percentage of public expenditure on education in GNP. Bray and Kwok (2003) brieﬂy review existing studies, which show that
the use of private tutoring is extensive even among primary school students in developing countries.
3Telles (1993) ﬁnds, in Brazilian metropolitan areas, that minorities (except Asians) are overrepresented in low-wage
informal-sector jobs in which being minorities has less negative eﬀects on earnings. For the Vietnam economy, van de Walle
and Gunewardena (2001) show that, compared to the majority Kinh, returns to education are lower but returns to land are
higher for minorities, suggesting that minorities choose to exert more eﬀorts on farming in which performance is less aﬀected by
their disadvantaged positions. For the U.S. economy, Bayard et al. (1999) ﬁnd that greater racial and ethnic wage disparities
for men than for women can be explained largely by more severe occupational and industry-level segregation among men.
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The economy is composed of up to two sectors, the primary sector with advanced technology and the
secondary sector with backward technology. They respectively correspond to formal/modern and infor-
mal/traditional sectors in developing economies, while in advanced economies, typical secondary-sector jobs
are neighborhood jobs at small businesses. Skilled and unskilled workers are perfectly substitutable.
In real economy, labor and product markets of the primary sector tend to be ethnically more mixed than
the secondary sector. In the integrated primary sector, a subordinate group, who are typically a minority but
could be a majority in a historically disadvantaged position, are prone to face disadvantages in production
or suﬀer greater disutility of work, because prevalent language, customs, taste, and culture are diﬀerent
from theirs, or they face taste-based discrimination. Hence, the eﬀect of skill investment on human capital
in the primary sector, where skilled workers have comparative advantages, is assumed to be smaller for
the subordinate group, while the investment raises human capital in the secondary sector equally for both
groups. Main implications of the model, however, remain intact without this assumption (although the
dynamics are aﬀected): it is imposed for analytical simplicity as well as for reality.
In the primary sector, due to complex production processes and organizational structures, evaluating each
worker’s contribution to output tends to be diﬃcult. Accurate evaluations are particularly diﬃcult at least
initially, if a worker and her evaluators belong to diﬀerent groups due to the above inter-group diﬀerences.4
Qualiﬁcations of a job applicant too tend to be assessed less precisely when interviewers are from other
groups. Hence, the wage is assumed to depend partly on her human capital and partly on its signal, the
average human capital (average wage) of her group in the sector (in the spirit of classic models of statistical
discrimination by Aigner and Cain, 1977, and Lundberg and Startz, 1983), and the signal’s importance
decreases with the group’s share in the sector’s skilled workers.5 In the secondary sector, typically, each
worker’s contribution is easy to measure, thus wage equals human capital.6
Wealth in the initial period is unequally distributed, and the inequality is transmitted intergenerationally
through transfers. Hence, generally, individuals are heterogeneous in accessibility to skill investment, and
those without enough wealth do not invest even if it is proﬁtable. Their descendants, however, may become
accessible if enough wealth is accumulated. (The opposite is true for oﬀspring of non-poor agents.)
An important property of the model is that skill investment and sectoral choices of individuals within and
across groups could be interrelated, because a worker’s wage in the primary sector depends on her group’s
4See footnotes 15 and 16 in Section 3 for evidence consistent with this and the next claim.
5As with many papers in the literature, it is implicitly supposed that education level is not a good signal, which implies
that the model is concerned with an economy where the quality of public schools is low or varies greatly across schools and
thus many people expend on supplementary study materials and tutoring or attend private schools, which, as mentioned at
the beginning, is the case in many countries. Skill investment of the model may be interpreted as spendings on these activities.
6The wage equations can be derived from proﬁt maximization problems of ﬁrms that hire workers and physical capital for
production (see footnote 19). Further, productivity growth can be incorporated without aﬀecting results qualitatively, as long
as the cost of skill investment is assumed to grow proportionately.
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average human capital in the sector (termed the group’s reputation) and the reputation’s importance in the
wage (termed the degree of prejudice toward the group), which decreases with the group’s share in the sector’s
skilled workers. Hence, the dynamics of wealth and economic positions of people too could be interrelated.
The paper examines how the initial distribution of wealth within and across groups aﬀects the dynamics of
skill investment, sectoral choices, intra and intergroup disparities, and the steady-state outcome.
Main results. First, sectoral choices and skill investment may not be socially optimal. Even if unskilled
workers are less productive in the primary sector,7 they may choose the sector due to a positive eﬀect from
skilled workers through the reputation. Individuals may not carry out productive investment due to the
negative eﬀect from unskilled workers. For a similar reason, it is possible that all skilled workers of a group
choose the secondary sector and all unskilled workers choose the primary sector, even if the former have
comparative advantages and are more productive in the primary sector. This result may explain the fact
that skilled people of subordinate groups often avoid primary-sector jobs and run small businesses instead.
Second, multiple equilibria could exist regarding skill investment and sectoral choices of skilled workers:
both the non-poor of a group invest (skilled workers of a group choose the primary sector) and do not could
be equilibria. Within a group, the source of multiplicity is strategic complementarity: to take the investment
as an example, as more people invest and get skilled, prejudice toward the group eases, primary-sector wages
reﬂect individual human capital more closely, and the return to investment rises. Across groups, strategic
substitutability is at work: as more people of a group invest, prejudice toward the other group intensiﬁes
and their return to investment falls. Hence, if the latter eﬀect is strong for both groups, either group invest
(choose the primary sector) and the other do not are equilibria; if the former eﬀect too is strong for both,
both groups invest (choose the sector) is also an equilibrium.
Third, the dynamics and long-run outcomes of groups, particularly of the subordinate group, depend
greatly on initial conditions and could be quite diﬀerent from a ”prejudice-free” economy. Since good (bad)
reputation tends to beget good (bad) reputation, a group starting with a good (bad) initial condition, i.e. a
high (low) fraction of them can aﬀord skill investment initially, tend to be in a good (bad) position in the
long run, according with empirical evidence such as Borjas (1994) cited above.
The mechanism can be explained intuitively based on an economy in which workers always choose the
primary sector and oﬀspring of unskilled workers of the dominant group become accessible to skill investment
over time (analyzed in Section 5.1.1). If the subordinate group’s initial condition is good and thus a relatively
large fraction of them are skilled initially, the wage of the group’s unskilled workers is relatively high because
7Individuals, particularly the minority, could be less productive in the primary sector if the quality of formal institutions
and thus the sector’s productivity are low, if non-statistical discrimination exists, or if the disutility of work is greater in the
sector (human capital may be measured net of the disutility).
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of the group’s good reputation. Further, as the dominant group increasingly become skilled, the reputation
becomes more important, which has a positive eﬀect on the wage. As a result, unskilled workers of the
subordinate group accumulate wealth over time, and some of their oﬀspring come to aﬀord investment at
some point. The number of the group’s skilled workers and the reputation start to rise, and the improved
reputation stimulates the upward mobility of the unskilled further. In the long run, all workers are skilled.
If the initial condition is bad, a similar mechanism aﬀects the group’s skilled workers negatively, and the
group are totally unskilled in the end.8
The dynamics of sectoral choices and the degree of labor market segregation too could be aﬀected greatly
by initial conditions. An intuitive explanation can be made based on an economy similar to the previous
one except that unskilled workers of the subordinate group choose the secondary sector while the reputation
is unimportant (analyzed in Section 5.1.2). As the dominant group increasingly become skilled and thus
reputation become more important to the subordinate group, unskilled workers of the latter group increas-
ingly choose the primary sector ineﬃciently, deteriorating their reputation. If the group’s initial condition
is good, however, the reputation stays high enough that the shift to the primary sector continues, and the
labor market becomes ethnically integrated eventually (and the dynamics become similar to the previous
economy). By contrast, if the initial condition is bad, the downward mobility of the group’s skilled workers
starts at some point, which worsens the reputation and increases its importance (deepens the prejudice) fur-
ther. Hence, the group’s unskilled workers increasingly choose the secondary sector. Eventually, all of the
subordinate group are unskilled and in the secondary sector, thus the labor market is segregated completely
by ethnicity. The ineﬃcient sectoral choices make the dynamics sensitive to the initial condition.
Fourth, when multiple equilibria exist regarding skill investment or sectoral choices of skilled workers,
which is the case when prejudice is severe or the eﬃcacy of skill investment is low, given initial conditions,
the initial selection of equilibrium could aﬀect the dynamics greatly.9 When multiple equilibrium choices
exist for the subordinate group, it is possible that, if the group’s non-poor happen to (not to) invest [or
choose the primary sector] initially, the number of the group’s skilled workers grows (falls) over time and
the group are totally skilled (unskilled) eventually (Sections 5.2.1 and 6.2). When multiple equilibria exist
for both groups, the long-run outcome of the dominant group too is sensitive to the initial selection (Section
5.2.2). The dominant group staring with a much better condition than the subordinate group could end up
with the smaller fraction of skilled workers, if they (the subordinate group) happen not to (to) invest [choose
8When institutionalized disadvantages of the subordinate group and advantages of the dominant group are small, the
dynamics of the dominant group too could be aﬀected greatly by initial conditions (Section 5.1.3). If both groups start with
bad conditions, both could end up without skilled workers: a bad impression each group has about the other group aﬀects the
skilled wage negatively, which causes the downward mobility of skilled workers and the impression deteriorates further.
9It is assumed that the initial coordination among individuals of a group continues for subsequent periods: if the group’s
non-poor happen to invest initially, they invest subsequently too. The assumption would be reasonable since children tend to
mimic parental behaviors in real society. Kim and Loury (2009) make a similar assumption in their model (see footnote 29).
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the primary sector] initially. The result suggests that, if the initial selection is aﬀected by institutionalized
discrimination limiting a group’s access to investment or skilled jobs in the primary sector, the discrimination
could have a lasting impact on their well-beings well after its abolishment, consistent with the ﬁnding of
the persistent eﬀect of initial discrimination by Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey (2001) cited above. Income or
wealth redistribution does little to change the situation, while aﬃrmative action treating them favorably in
skill investment or primary-sector employment, such as tuition or wage subsidies, can be very eﬀective.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 reviews the related literature and details contributions of the
paper in the literature. Section 3 presents and analyzes the model’s static part. Section 4 presents the
full-ﬂedged model and Section 5 analyzes the dynamics. Section 6 examines a general case by lifting one
assumption that excludes situations of severe prejudice and low relative eﬃcacy of skill investment in the
primary sector. Section 7 concludes. Appendix contains proofs of lemmas and propositions.
2 Related Literature
Literature on statistical discrimination. Models of statistical discrimination examine the situation
where employers cannot observe workers’ skills and thus use two kinds of signals, race and a signal imperfectly
correlated with individual skill, such as a test and an on-the-job monitoring, to screen workers (see Fang
and Moro, 2010, for a survey). The ﬁrst type of models such as Coate and Loury (1993) explain skill and
earnings disparities among groups with equal endowment based on multiple equilibria. Employers assign
individuals to two kinds of jobs, jobs requiring skill investment for good performance and those not, based
on the signals. Since one’s return to investment increases with investments by others of her race, multiple
equilibria with diﬀerent shares of skilled workers could exist. The second type of models, by contrast, assume
that the non-race signal is nosier for the subordinate group to explain the disparities. Lundberg and Startz
(1983), drawing on Phelps (1972) and Aigner and Cain (1977), develop a model where wage equals expected
marginal productivity conditional on the signals. The return to investment is lower for the subordinate
group due to the noisier signal and thus they invest less even if groups’ endowment is identical.
Recent major progress in the literature are twofold. One is the extension to a dynamic setting. This
is particularly important to the ﬁrst type of models, where employers’ self-conﬁrming beliefs about groups’
skill levels select an equilibrium, because a static model does not explain how such beliefs are formed. Kim
and Loury (2009) develop a continuous-time OLG model in which employers’ beliefs are formed based on
objective information on groups’ present and future skill levels (reputations) and are updated with changing
investments. If the initial reputation of a group is high (low), the group converges to the high (low) reputation
steady state, while if it is intermediate, the group could converge to either steady state, i.e. self-conﬁrming
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expectations determine the ﬁnal state as in static models.
The other is the consideration of inter-group interactions. In the above models, diﬀerent groups do not
interact and thus behaviors and welfare of one group do not aﬀect those of other groups.10 Chaudhuri
and Sethi (2008) present a static model of the ﬁrst type in which the investment cost depends on both
individual ability and the fraction of skilled peers, which equals a weighted average of the fractions in one’s
own group and in the overall population and the constant weight on own group is interpreted as the degree
of segregation. In a special case, they show that, in an economy where inter-group inequality exists under
complete segregation, complete integration eliminates inequality and raises (lowers) shares of skilled workers
of both groups, if the fraction of the initially disadvantaged group is low (high). Lundberg and Startz (2007)
construct a random search model with a second-type element where searchers observe imperfect signals of
potential partners’ abilities. In a one-sided search model where homogenous white searchers observe more
accurate signals of whites than of blacks, there could exist an equilibrium where they trade only with whites
with good signal, even if both groups have identical ability distribution. In a two-sided search model where
searchers are heterogenous in ability and race (and signals observed by black searchers reveal abilities of
both races equally), they numerically show that there could exist an equilibrium of racially segregated
transactions where high ability whites (blacks) accept only whites (blacks) with good signal.
Contributions of the paper in the literature. This paper shares with the second type of models
such as Lundberg and Startz (1983) the feature that the importance of own group’s average human capital
(reputation) in wage is diﬀerent among groups (footnote 17). The existing works assume that the importance
is constant and greater for a subordinate group, while, in this paper, it decreases with the share of own group
in primary-sector skilled workers. Unlike these works, the model is dynamic and inter-group disparities could
change over time, thus making the reputation’s importance depend on the endogenous variable would be
crucial. Such formulation yields a diﬀerent kind of inter-group interactions from works such as Lundberg
and Startz (2007) and Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008), and the interactions generate a diﬀerent type of multiple
equilibria from works such as Coate and Loury (1993).
Further, the paper models sectoral choices between the primary and the secondary sectors, where repu-
tation could aﬀect wage only in the former, and the credit constraint in skill investment, both of which are
not considered in other works but are important real-economy elements, as stated in the introduction. The
credit constraint generates upward and downward mobilities of lineages through intergenerational transmis-
10Hence, the models cannot provide economic rationales for institutionalized discrimination used to be enforced by dominant
groups in many countries. Moro and Norman (2004) construct a static general equilibrium model of the Coate and Loury type,
in which productivities of two types of jobs are interrelated. When the two jobs are complementary, an increased share of skilled
workers has a negative (positive) eﬀect on the wage of good (bad) jobs, and thus the return to investment of a dominant group
is negatively aﬀected by investment of the disadvantaged group, giving dominant groups an incentive for the discrimination.
6
sion of wealth and thus the interesting group dynamics described in the introduction, whereas modeling the
sectoral choice allows the paper to examine the dynamics of labor market segregation.
Regarding several elements, the paper employs a simpler setting: there is no non-race signal, which
implicitly supposes that one’s contribution to production cannot be observed initially but is fully revealed
later; the investment cost is homogeneous; and the generational structure is simpler than the dynamic model
of Kim and Loury (2009). However, because of the simpler setting, it can consider the above-mentioned new
elements and examine how transitional dynamics as well as steady states depend on the initial condition
using phase diagrams. Further, it can identify conditions under which multiple equilibria exist, the dynamics
are diﬀerent from a ”prejudice-free” economy, inter-group disparities are eradicated in the long run, etc.
Other related studies. Studies that examine the dynamics of inter-group inequality based on models
without statistical discrimination too are closely related.11 Lundberg and Startz (1998), based on Loury
(1977) and the ’ethnic capital’ model of Borjas (1992), examine a dynamic two-group economy in which
human capital is the engine of growth and there exist spillovers from coworkers in production and from
elder neighbors and, for the minority, from elders of the majority in skill development. Individuals are
assumed to be segregated by ethnicity both in the workplace and in residence. There are no spillovers from
the minority to the majority and inter-group inequality disappears in the long run. Using a version of the
model with heterogeneous innate ability and without the third spillover, they examine the eﬀect of workplace
desegregation, i.e. allowing the minority to move to majority-dominated jobs by paying a mobility cost, on
the dynamics. They examine the eﬀect of one-time workplace desegregation, while this paper examines the
dynamics of labor market segregation in an economy where workers can freely choose sectors.
The modeling of skill investment and intergenerational transmission of wealth draws on Galor and Zeira
(1993) and Yuki (2008), in which, as in this paper, skill investment is constrained by intergenerational
transfers motivated by impure altruism.
3 Static Model
This section presents and analyzes the static part of the model. The dynamic part is presented in the
next section. Consider a small open economy (interest rate r is exogenous) populated by a continuum of
individuals who belong to one of two ethnic (racial, religious) groups. Results in this section can be applied
to traits that are not intergenerationally transmitted, such as gender and native region, as well.
11Bowles, Loury, and Sethi (2012), building on Loury (1977), construct a discrete-time OLG model with two groups, where
the cost of skill investment is modeled as in Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008). They prove that, when the degree of segregation
is suﬃciently high, the long-run group equality cannnot be attained even with very small initial inequality. In a special
case, they show a dynamic version of the result of Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008) mentioned earlier. Yuki (2009) examines the
dynamics of disparities between educated and uneducated workers in a one-group and one-sector economy where innate ability
is heterogeneous and wage is determined as in this paper (education is the signal).
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Individuals decide whether or not to invest in skill. The cost of skill investment ch must be self-ﬁnanced,
so they must have enough wealth. Skilled and unskilled workers are perfectly substitutable.
There exist up to two sectors, the primary sector with advanced technology and the secondary sector
with backward technology. They respectively correspond to formal/modern and informal/traditional sectors
in developing economies, while in advanced economies, typical secondary-sector jobs would be neighborhood
jobs at small businesses. In real economy, labor and product markets of the primary sector tend to be
ethnically more mixed than the other sector (Aslund and Skans, 2010), probably due to diﬀerences in
needed skills, scales of operations, and enforcement of law.12
Two assumptions are made based on the fact. First, skill investment raises human capital from hu
(u is for unskilled) to hs (s is for skilled) in the secondary sector, while, in the primary sector, it raises
human capital of ethnic (racial, religious) group i from Auihu to Asihs, where the relative human capital
Aki (k=u; s) is weakly greater for the dominant group (group 1 ) than the subordinate group (group 2 ):
Ak1 ¸ Ak2: (1)
Given skill, human capital in the sector is lower for the subordinate group, who are typically the minority but
could be the majority in a historically disadvantaged position.13 The assumption captures the fact that, in
the integrated primary sector, they are prone to face disadvantages in production or suﬀer greater disutility
of work (human capital may be measured net of the disutility), because prevalent language, customs, taste,
and culture are diﬀerent from theirs. Further, if taste-based discrimination exists, they are not assigned
relevant tasks and end up in lower productivity.14 Note that Aki < 1 is possible if the quality of formal
institutions and thus the sector’s productivity are low (as explained in footnote 19 below, Aki increases with
the sector’s relative productivity), if the discrimination exists, or if the disutility is greater in the sector.
As is made clear later, the assumption is imposed for analytical simplicity as well as for reality, and main
implications remain intact without it. By contrast, the next assumption is crucial. In the primary sector,
due to complex production processes and organizational structures, evaluating each worker’s contribution
to output tends to be diﬃcult. Accurate evaluations are particularly diﬃcult at least initially, if a worker
and her evaluators belong to diﬀerent groups due to the above-mentioned inter-group diﬀerences (Giuliano,
12Primary-sector ﬁrms need workers with highly specialized skills and scales of operations tend to be large. Thus, to assign
jobs to workers with appropriate skills eﬃciently, labor markets tend to be anonymous and ethnically integrated. Further,
the sector tends to be regulated by laws prohibiting overt employment discrimination. By contrast, in the secondary sector
with the contrasting features, employment is largely through personal connections and thus labor markets are more segregated.
Also, products of the primary sector are supplied to national markets, while those of the secondary sector, especially services,
are mainly for local markets of particular groups. For the Swedish economy, Aslund and Skans (2010) ﬁnd that the tendency
for a minority worker to work with people of his/her group is stronger in smaller establishments.
13Skill and human capital are diﬀerent : skill is ability and has two levels, while human capital is the contribution of skill to
output and workers of given skill can be diﬀerent in human capital levels depending on sectoral choices and ethnicity.
14Taste-based discrimination seems to aﬀect labor market outcomes even in advanced nations. For the U.S., Charles and
Guryan (2008) ﬁnd that white-black wage gaps in a state are related to the degree of bias by whites in the left tail of the bias
distribution in the state, consistent with the model of Becker (1971).
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Levine, and Leonard, 2011; Pinkerson, 2006).15 Qualiﬁcations of a job applicant too tend to be assessed less
precisely when interviewers are from the other group (Stoll, Raphael, and Holzer, 2004; Fryer, Pager, and
Spenkuch, 2011).16 Hence, the wage is assumed to depend partly on her human capital and partly on its
signal, the average human capital (average wage) of her group in the sector (in the spirit of classic models
by Aigner and Cain, 1977, and Lundberg and Startz, 1983),17 and the signal’s importance decreases with
the group’s share in the sector’s skilled workers.
As with many papers in the literature, it is implicitly supposed that observable education level is not
a good signal, implying that the model is concerned with an economy where the quality of public schools
is low or varies greatly across schools and thus many people expend on supplementary study materials and
tutoring or attend private schools, which, as mentioned in the introduction, is the case in many countries
(see footnote 2 for details). Skill investment of the model may be interpreted as spendings on these activities.
The wage of an individual with skill level k (k=u; s) of group i is given by:
(1¡si)Akihk+siE[Aihi]; (2)
where si 2 [0;1] measures the importance of the average human capital, E[Aihi], and decreases with the
share:18
si=s
µ
psiHiNi
psiHiNi+psjHjNj
¶
; j 6= i; s0(¢)<0; s(1)=0: (3)
Hi is the fraction of skilled workers in group i, Ni is the group’s population, and psi is the probability that
a skilled worker of the group chooses the primary sector. The size of si reﬂects the degree of the incomplete
information and is named the degree of prejudice toward the group. If the sector’s skilled workers are all
from her group, s(1)= 0 for simplicity. The average human capital, termed the group’s reputation, equals
(pui is the probability for an unskilled worker):
E[Akihk]=
psiHiAsihs+pui(1¡Hi)Auihu
psiHi+pui(1¡Hi) : (4)
In the secondary sector, typically, each worker’s contribution is easy to measure, thus wage equals human
capital, hk (k=u; s).
15Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard (2011) ﬁnd, for a large U.S. retail ﬁrm, that employees generally have better outcomes,
particularly in dismissals and promotions, when they are the same race as their supervisors. Further, Pinkerson (2006) ﬁnds that
the eﬀect of AFQT scores, a measure of skills not observed directly by employers, on wages increases with experience for black
men but does not change for white men in the U.S., which could be explained by the fact that managers are overwhelmingly
white. By contrast, Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo (2010) ﬁnd similar eﬀects of AFQT scores on wages of the two groups.
16Stoll, Raphael, and Holzer (2004) ﬁnd that establishments where blacks are in charge of hiring are signiﬁcantly more likely
to employ blacks than those with white hiring agents, and this can be explained by the higher application rate of blacks and
the higher hiring rate of black applicants in the former establishments in the U.S. Further, Fryer, Pager, and Spenkuch (2011)
ﬁnd that the black unemployed are willing to accept lower wages than whites who previously earned as much in New Jersey.
17Unlike this model, workers’ contributions to output are never revealed and thus a worker’s wage equals a weighted average
of her group’s average human capital and her non-race signal, and the importance of the race signal (corresponding to si in
the equations below) is constant and is assumed to be greater for the subordinate group in their models.
18An interpretation of si is that evaluators cannot recognize her skill during the ﬁrst si fraction of time but can identify it
after that. Alternatively, (1¡si)Akihk may be construed as the amount of her contribution recognized precisely by them.
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The wage equations can be derived from proﬁt maximization problems of ﬁrms that hire workers and
physical capital.19 Further, productivity growth can be incorporated without aﬀecting results qualitatively,
as long as the cost of skill investment ch is assumed to grow proportionately.
The following assumptions are imposed on Aki (k=u; s) and the function s(¢).
Assumption 1 (i) Asi¸Aui
(ii) Asi>1 and Asihs¡(1+r)ch¡maxfAui;1ghu¸0, Asi¸ (1+r)ch+maxfAui;1ghuhs
(iii) s(0)+ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu ·1, Asi¸ huhsAui+ hs¡hu(1¡s(0))hs .
The ﬁrst assumption states that skilled workers have comparative advantages (weakly) in the primary sector,
which would be justiﬁed from the fact that the sector adopts more advanced technology and thus workers’
skills are more important. The second assumption states that skilled workers are more productive in the
primary sector and the net social return to skill investment is non-negative. An old version of the paper
(Yuki, 2012), which does not impose this assumption, shows that the result is diﬀerent from the ”prejudice-
free” economy only when this condition holds. The last assumption means that the net private return to
choosing the primary sector is weakly higher for skilled workers even when the degree of prejudice is severest,
i.e. si=s(0) (the assumption can be expressed as [(1¡s(0))Asi¡1]hs¸ [(1¡s(0))Aui¡1]hu). The ﬁrst two
assumptions are maintained throughout the paper, while the last one is relaxed in Section 6.
3.1 Sectoral choices and skill investment
Since workers are freely mobile between the sectors, they choose the one(s) with higher earnings. The next
lemma presents equilibrium values of psi and pui for given psj (j 6= i), when Hi > 0 and psjHj > 0, in
which case si > 0 holds from (3).20 Only equilibria that are stable with respect to small perturbations to
equilibrium psi and pui are considered.21
Lemma 1 (Sectoral choices) Suppose Hi>0 and psjHj>0 for j 6= i.
(i) When Aui¸1, psi=pui=1.
(ii) When Aui < 1, psi = 1. pui = 0 for si · (1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu , pui =
siAsihs+(1¡si)Auihu¡hu
(1¡Aui)hu
Hi
1¡Hi 2 (0;1) for
si2
¡ (1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ;
1
Hi
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu
¢
, and pui=1 for higher si:
When (Asi¸)Aui¸1, that is, when both types of workers weakly prefer the primary sector under si=0,
they do choose the sector. Intuitively, the reason is that, with si> 0 and psi> 0, unskilled workers beneﬁt
19Suppose that ﬁrms with an identical CRS technology hire both factors in each sector. Then, by normalizing the wage rate
per human capital (which depends on total factor productivity and the interest rate) of the informal sector to 1, the same wage
equations are obtained. The relative human capital in the formal sector Aki increases with the sector’s relative TFP.
20Clearly, when Hi= 0 or psjHj =0 for j 6= i (thus si=0), psi=1 (when Hi> 0) and pui=1(= 0) if Aui> (<)1 and any
pui2 [0;1] if Aui=1.
21An equilibrium is deﬁned to be stable regarding the perturbations if there exists a neighborhood of equilibrium psi and pui
such that, from any psi and pui in the neighborhood, they have tendencies to return to equilibrium values in a simple dynamics
in which pki increases (decreases) when the net return to choosing the formal sector for type k workers is positive (negative).
10
from the presence of skilled workers in the sector and thus strictly prefer the sector, and the net return
from choosing the sector is higher for skilled workers from Assumption 1 (iii). When (Asi>) 1>Aui, skilled
workers select the primary sector, while choices of unskilled workers depend on si: since the positive eﬀect
from skilled workers increases with si, they select the primary (secondary) sector when si is large (small),
and when si is intermediate, they are indiﬀerent between the sectors and pui2(0;1) is increasing in si.
Taking into account the dependence of wages on sectoral choices, an individual decides on skill investment.
As detailed in the next section, she can spend wealth on assets too. Thus, she invests in skill only if it is
ﬁnancially accessible and proﬁtable. Let Fi be the proportion of individuals who can aﬀord the investment
in group i. Hi cannot exceed Fi but may not equal Fi. Let phi be the probability that an individual with
enough wealth does invest. To simplify the analysis, the following assumption is imposed on phi.
Assumption 2 If individuals are indiﬀerent among multiple values of phi, the highest value is realized.
For example, when psi = pui = 0 and hs¡ (1+r)ch¡hu = 0, phi = 1 holds. The next lemma presents
equilibrium Hi=phiFi for given Hj and psj (j 6= i) when Fi>0. Only equilibria that are stable with respect
to a small perturbation to equilibrium phi are considered.
Lemma 2 (Skill investment) Suppose Fi>0.
(i) When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu; Hi=Fi.
(ii) When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, Hi=Fi when psjHj=0 for j 6= i. When psjHj>0 (thus si>0),
(a) If Aui¸1, Hi=Fi if s(0)·1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu ; otherwise, both Hi=Fi and Hi=0 are equilibria (Hi=0 is
the equilibrium) when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<(¸)1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu .
(b) If Aui<1, Hi=Fi (no stable equilibria exist) when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<(¸)1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu .
When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu, i.e. the investment is socially productive (and privately proﬁtable) in the secondary
sector, every individual with enough wealth invests in skill, because, in the case where choosing the primary
sector is more proﬁtable, the net private return to the investment is weakly higher than hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu
from Assumption 1 (i) (when psjHj=0 for j 6= i) and (iii) (when psjHj>0).
By contrast, when hs¡ (1+r)ch < hu, the decision depends on Aui, si, and s(0). When Aui ¸ 1 and
psjHj > 0 for j 6= i, since all workers choose the primary sector from Lemma 1 (i), the net return equals
(1¡si)[Asihs¡Auihu]¡(1+r)ch and decreases with si. Hence, if the value of si at Hi=Fi is small enough
that the net return is positive at Hi=Fi, i.e. s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi is an equilibrium,
while if s(0)> 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu and thus the return is negative at Hi = 0, Hi = 0 is an equilibrium. Since
s(0)>s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
, both Hi=Fi and Hi=0 are equilibria when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu <s(0)
due to strategic complementarity : as more people invest and become skilled workers, the degree of prejudice
si falls and primary-sector wages reﬂect human capital more closely, raising the return. The result when
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Figure 1: Sectoral choices of unskilled workers when hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu and psjHj>0 for j 6= i
Aui<1 and psjHj>0 can be explained similarly. In this case, however, Hi=0 is not an equilibrium (since,
given Hi = 0, no unskilled workers choose the primary sector and thus the investment is proﬁtable from
Assumption 1 (ii), Asihs¡(1+r)ch¸hs), thus no stable equilibria exist if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu ,
i.e. si is too high for the return to be positive at Hi=Fi.
By combining Lemmas 1 and 2, skill investment and sectoral choices of group i given choices by the
other group are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Group i’s investment and sectoral choices given choices by group j )
(i) When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu; Hi=Fi and psi=1.
(a) When psjHj > 0 for j 6= i, if Aui ¸ 1, pui = 1; and if Aui < 1, pui = 0 for si · (1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu , pui =
siAsihs+(1¡si)Auihu¡hu
(1¡Aui)hu
Fi
1¡Fi 2(0;1) for si2
¡ (1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ;
1
Fi
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu
¢
, and pui=1 for higher si.
(b) When psjHj=0, pui=1(= 0) if Aui>(<)1 and any pui2 [0;1] if Aui=1.
(ii) When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, psi=1 and, when psjHj=0; Hi=Fi. When psjHj>0,
(a) If Aui¸1, Hi=Fi if s(0)·1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , otherwise, both Hi=Fi and Hi=0 are equilibria (Hi=0 is
the equilibrium) when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<(¸)1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu .
(b) If Aui<1, Hi=Fi (no stable equilibria exist) when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<(¸)1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu .
(c) pui is determined as in (i)(a) [(i)(b)] when psjHj> 0 and Hi=Fi [in other cases]:
Based on Proposition 1 (i), Figure 1 illustrates sectoral choices of unskilled workers when hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu
and psjHj>0 for j 6= i on the (Aui; Asi) plane. (In this case, Hi=Fi and psi=1 always hold.) Aui and Asi
must satisfy Assumption 1 (i)¡(iii), thus only the upper left region of the three bold solid lines is feasible.
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Figure 2: Skill investment and sectoral choices of unskilled workers when hs¡(1+ r)ch<hu and psjHj>0
Their choices are determined by the two bold broken lines, and pui=0 (=1) in the region at the left (right)
side of the left (right) broken line and pui 2 (0;1) in the region between the lines. (When pui 2 (0;1), pui
increases with Aui and Asi.) pui > 0 is possible with Aui < 1 because of the positive eﬀect from skilled
workers in the primary sector. Positions of the lines and thus the value of pui depend on Fi through si:
Figure 2 illustrates skill investment and sectoral choices of unskilled workers when hs¡ (1+r)ch < hu
and psjHj > 0, based on Proposition 1 (ii).22 (psi = 1 always holds.) When Aui ¸ 1, pui = 1 holds,
and Hi = Fi (Hi = 0) is the only equilibrium in the region on or above Asi = huhsAui +
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs (on or
below Asi= huhsAui +
(1+r)ch
(1¡si)hs ), while both Hi=Fi and Hi=0 are equilibria between the two lines, the area
with slanting lines. When Aui < 1, Hi = Fi holds above Asi = huhsAui+
(1+r)ch
(1¡si)hs and no equilibria exist on
or below it (the area with vertical lines). Sectoral choices when Aui < 1 are as in Figure 1. Positions of
Asi= huhsAui+
(1+r)ch
(1¡si)hs and of the two broken lines and thus their choices depend on Fi through si:
Sectoral choices and skill investment may not be socially optimal when si>0. When Aui<1, because of
the positive eﬀect from skilled workers, some or all of unskilled workers choose the less productive primary
sector at the right side of the left broken line of Figures 1 and 2. When Aui¸1, an individual may not carry
out the socially productive investment in the region below Asi= huhsAui+
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs due to the negative eﬀect
of unskilled workers on the private return to investment.
22The ﬁgure is drawn assuming hs¡ (1¡s(0))(1+r)cs· hu: When hs¡ (1¡s(0))(1+r)cs> hu; the bold solid line for Assumption
1 (ii) is located below the line for Assumption 1 (iii) when Aui> 1; as in Figure 1.
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Investment and sectoral choices of the two groups are determined by applying the proposition to the
groups simultaneously. Cases in which the investment is always proﬁtable for both groups can be easily
identiﬁed from the proposition (see Figure 2 too).
Corollary 1 (Cases in which the investment is always proﬁtable for both groups) Hi = Fi for any i
and Fi; when hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu and when hs¡(1+r)ch<hu and s(0)·1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu for any i.
In other cases, the determination of Hi is not simple, which is examined in Proposition 2 of Section 5 with
an additional assumption.
3.2 Wages
Wage levels depend on skill investment and sectoral choices. Denote the unskilled wage of group i by wui
and the skilled wage net of the investment cost by wsi. Then, the wages when Hi =Fi and psjHj > 0 for
j 6= i, i.e. si>0, are:
if pui=1; wui = (1¡si)Auihu+si[FiAsihs+(1¡Fi)Auihu]
= Auihu+siFi(Asihs¡Auihu); (5)
wsi = (1¡si)Asihs+si[FiAsihs+(1¡Fi)Auihu]¡(1+r)ch
= Asihs¡si(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu)¡(1+r)ch; (6)
if pui2(0;1); wui = (1¡si)Auihu+si FiAsihs+pui(1¡Fi)AuihuFi+pui(1¡Fi) = hu; (7)
wsi = (1¡si)Asihs +si FiAsihs+pui(1¡Fi)AuihuFi+pui(1¡Fi) ¡(1+r)ch
= hu+(1¡si)(Asihs¡Auihu)¡(1+r)ch; (8)
and if pui = 0, wui = hu and wsi = Asihs¡ (1+r)ch. When Hi = 0 or si = 0, wui = maxfAui; 1ghu and
wsi=Asihs¡(1+r)ch (when Hi>0).
4 Dynamic model
Based on the previous section, this section presents the dynamic part of the model. Consider an OLG
economy composed of a continuum of two-period-lived individuals. The distribution of wealth over the initial
generation of each group is given, while distributions of subsequent generations are determined endogenously.
4.1 Lifetime of an individual
Childhood : In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from her parent (if she belongs to the initial
generation, it is given) and spends it on two options, assets (yields interest rate r) and skill investment
(costs ch), to maximize future income. Consider an individual born into a lineage of group i in period t¡1
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who, in period t, receives bit units of transfer and allocates it between asset ait and skill investment vit.
When Hit=Fit, i.e. phit=1, the allocation is determined by bit:
ait=bit; vit=0; if bit<ch; (9)
ait=bit¡ch; vit=ch; if bit¸ch: (10)
By contrast, when Hit=0, i.e. phit=0, ait=bit and vit=0.
Adulthood : In adulthood, she chooses a sector to work, obtains income from assets and work, and spends
it on consumption cit and a transfer to her single child bit+1. Her utility maximization problem is:
maxuit = (cit)1¡°b(bit+1)°b ; s:t: cit+bit+1 = wit+(1+r)ait; (11)
where °b2(0;1) and wit is her gross wage. By solving the problem, her consumption and transfer rules equal
cit = (1¡°b)fwit+(1+r)aitg; (12)
bit+1 = °bfwit+(1+r)aitg: (13)
Generational change: At the beginning of period t + 1, current adults pass away, current children
become adults, and new children are born into the economy. Since each adult has one child, the total
(adult) population of the group is time-invariant and equals Ni.
4.2 Dynamics of individual transfers
The dynamic equation linking the received transfer bit to the transfer given to the next generation bit+1 is
derived from the transfer rule (13). For a current unskilled worker, it is obtained by substituting wit=wuit
and ait=bit into (13):
bit+1 = °bfwuit+(1+r)bitg: (14)
The assumption °b(1+ r) < 1 is made so that the ﬁxed point of the equation for given wuit, b¤(wuit) ´
°b
1¡°b(1+r)wuit, exists. The ﬁxed point becomes crucial in later analyses.
For a current skilled worker, who exists only when Hit=Fit, the dynamic equation is
bit+1 = °bfwsit+(1+r)bitg; (15)
which is obtained by substituting wit=wsit+(1+r)ch and ait=bit¡ch into (13).
The equations show that the dynamics of transfers within a lineage depend on the dynamics of wages
and Hit, which in turn are determined by the time evolution of Fit and Fjt (j 6= i).
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4.3 Aggregate dynamics
The time evolution of Fit (the fraction of group i individuals who can aﬀord skill investment) is determined
by the dynamics of individual transfers. That is, the individual and aggregate dynamics are interrelated.
More speciﬁcally, when Hit = Fit, if oﬀspring of some unskilled workers become accessible to the in-
vestment through wealth accumulation, Fit+1 >Fit, while, if some of present skilled workers cannot leave
enough transfers to cover the investment cost, Fit+1<Fit.
The former takes places iﬀ there exist lineages satisfying bit<ch and bit+1¸ch. From (14), the following
condition must hold for such lineages to exist:
b¤(wuit) ´ °b1¡°b(1+r)wuit > ch: (16)
By contrast, the latter occurs iﬀ lineages satisfying bit¸ ch and bit+1<ch exist. From (15), the necessary
condition is
b¤(wsit) ´ °b1¡°b(1+r)wsit < ch: (17)
Since b¤(wsit) ¸ b¤(wuit), the above equations do not hold simultaneously. If (16) holds, Fit+1 ¸ Fit,
while if (17) is true, Fit+1 · Fit: (Fit+1 = Fit is possible depending on the distribution of transfers, but,
if the condition continues to hold, Fit does change at some point.) When neither equations are satisﬁed,
Fit+1=Fit. The dynamics when Hit=0 depend on the relative value of b
¤
(wuit) to ch only.
Regarding the value of b¤(wuit), the following is assumed.
Assumption 3 hu· 1¡°b(1+r)°b ch
This implies that b¤(wuit) · ch when pui;t < 1, that is, oﬀspring of unskilled workers can never aﬀord the
investment if the unskilled wage stays at the level in the secondary sector, hu. The assumption rules out
the trivial case in which hu>
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch and thus Fit always increases.
Since the dynamics of individual transfers depend, through skill investment and wages, on the evolution
of Fjt (j 6= i) as well, the dynamics of Fit and Fjt are interrelated. The next section examines the joint
dynamics of the variables, thereby analyzing the dynamics of variables of interest.
5 Analyses
This section analyzes the time evolution of Fit, skill composition, sectoral choices, wages, and intergroup
inequality by using phase diagrams. As can be inferred from Figures 1 and 2, various dynamics arise
depending on values of exogenous variables such as Asi and Aui, thus analyses focus on cases that are
representative and yield clear-cut results.
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For simplicity, the elasticity of si with respect to Fi (in absolute value) is assumed to be less than 1 in
dynamic analyses, although all of main results hold without the assumption.
Assumption 4 s(x)+s0(x)x(1¡x) > 0 for any x2 [0; 1), @(siFi)@Fi > 0 always.
5.1 When skill investment is always proﬁtable
First, consider the case in which Hi=Fi always holds for any group i. From Corollary 1, this is true when
hs¡(1+r)ch ¸ hu, or when hs¡(1+r)ch <hu and s(0)+ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu · 1 for any i (see Figure 2). That is,
skill investment is socially productive even in the secondary sector, the investment is highly productive in
the primary sector, or the maximum degree of prejudice s(0) is low.
5.1.1 When disadvantages of the subordinate group are moderate
Consider an economy where a dominant group (group 1 ) and a subordinate group (group 2 ) exist, i.e.
Ak1 > Ak2 (k = u; s). Suppose that institutionalized disadvantages the latter group face are moderate
enough (or the relative productivity of the primary sector is high enough, see footnote 19) that Aki>1 for
any k=u; s and i=1; 2, i.e. all workers are more productive in the primary sector. Then, psi=pui=1 from
Proposition 1, i.e. all workers choose the sector. Skill investment of those with enough wealth and sectoral
choices are socially optimal from Aki>1 and the conditions of Corollary 1.
As for the dynamics of F1t, it is assumed that institutionalized advantages of the dominant group are large
enough that Au1hu >
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch, that is, even with the lowest wage, descendants of the group’s unskilled
workers can aﬀord the investment eventually. Then, F1t increases over time and H¤1 = F
¤
1 = 1 in the long
run (superscript ¤ indicates the steady state value). In contrast, Au2 and As2 are lower and the following is
assumed: Au2hu<
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch, i.e. with the lowest wage, descendants of unskilled workers of the subordinate
group remain unskilled;
£
1¡s¡ N2N1+N2¢¤Au2hu+s¡ N2N1+N2¢As2hs> 1¡°b(1+r)°b ch, i.e. with the highest wage (from
Assumption 4), they can aﬀord the investment eventually; As2hs> ch°b and (1¡s(0))As2hs+s(0)Au2hu< ch°b ,
i.e. with the highest (lowest) wage, descendants of skilled workers of the group can (cannot) stay skilled.
Then, b¤(wu2)=ch and b¤(ws2)=ch exist and equal:
Au2hu+s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
F2(As2hs¡Au2hu)= 1¡°b(1+r)°b ch; (18)
As2hs¡s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
(1¡F2)(As2hs¡Au2hu)= ch°b ; (19)
which are obtained by plugging (5) and (6) with s2 = s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
into (16) (with > replaced by =) and
(17) (with < replaced by =), respectively.23
23Since wu2 for given
F2
F1
increases with F2 and b¤(wu2)>(<)ch at (F1;F2)=(1;1) (as F2!0 on F2F1 =1) from the assumptions
on wu2 (see eq. 18), there exists F22 (0;1) on F2F1 =1 satisfying b
¤(wu2)=ch. b¤(ws2)=ch exists for any F12 (0;1] (b¤(ws2)>ch
at F1=0) since, for F1 6= 0, ws2 increases with F2 and b¤(ws2)< (>)ch at F2=0 (=1) from the assumptions on ws2 (see eq. 19).
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Figure 3: Dynamics when Hit=Fit always and group 2’s disadvantages are moderate
The dynamics of F1t and F2t can be analyzed graphically by placing b¤(wu2)=ch and b¤(ws2)=ch on the
(F1;F2) plane (Figure 3).24 b¤(wu2)= ch is negatively sloped and b¤(ws2)= ch is positively sloped from (18)
and (19) (since s2 increases (decreases) with F1 (F2) and s2F2 increases with F2). The direction of motion
of F2t (F1t) is represented by vertical (horizontal) arrows. Since ws2 decreases and wu2 increases with F1; in
the region at the right (left) side of b¤(ws2)=ch, b¤(ws2)< (>)ch and F2t decreases (non-decreases) over time,
while in the region at the right (left) side of b¤(wu2)=ch, b¤(wu2)> (<)ch and F2t increases (non-increases).
Unlike the economy in which reputation does not aﬀect wages, i.e. sit=0 always, where F1t increases
and F2t is constant over time, the long-run fate of the subordinate group could be very diﬀerent depending
on the level of F2 in the initial period, F20.
When the initial distribution of wealth is such that a suﬃciently large portion of them can aﬀord the
investment, to be accurate, when b¤(wu2)>ch at (F1;F2)=(1;F20), H¤2 =F
¤
2 =1 as well as H
¤
1 =F
¤
1 =1 in the
long run. As an illustration, suppose that F10 is not so high that b¤(wu20)<ch holds. Then, as H1t =F1t
grows over time, the inﬂuence of the dominant group in wage determination becomes stronger and wages
of the subordinate group are aﬀected more by their reputation, i.e. s2t increases. As a result, the unskilled
(skilled) wage of group 2 rises (falls) over time. Since H2t =F20 is not low and thus their reputation (average
human capital) is not bad, the wage of skilled workers stays high enough for their descendants to remain
skilled, while the unskilled wage grows to the point that the investment becomes aﬀordable to some of their
24b¤(wu2) = ch intersects with F1 = 1 at F2 2 (0;1) and with F2 = 1 at F1 2 (0;1) from the two assumptions on wu2.
b¤(ws2) = ch intersects with F1 = 1 at F2 2 (0;1) from the assumptions on ws2, does not intersect with F2 = 0 from (1¡
s (0))As2hs+s (0)Au2hu <
ch
°b
, and not with F1 = 0 from As2hs >
ch
°b
. (Thus, it approaches (F1;F2) = (0;0).) b¤(wu2) = ch
and b¤(ws2) = ch do not intersect from ws2 > wu2 for F2 > 0. In the ﬁgure, b¤(ws2) = cs is always below the 450 line, but if
1¡s  N2
N1+N2

As2hs+s
  N2
N1+N2

Au2hu<
cs
°b
, it crosses the line.
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oﬀspring at some point, i.e. b¤(wu2t)> ch. H2t = F2t and the reputation start to rise, and the improved
reputation further stimulates the upward mobility. In the long run, everyone becomes a skilled worker.
By contrast, when F20 is small enough that b¤(ws2)< ch at (F1;F2) = (1;F20), (H¤1 ;H
¤
2 ) = (1;0) in the
long run. Since group 2’s initial reputation is low and its eﬀect on wages strengthens over time, the wage of
skilled workers falls to the point that their oﬀspring become unable to aﬀord the investment at some point.
F2t start to decrease and the deteriorated reputation spurs the downward mobility. In the long run, all of
group 2 are unskilled. (When F20 is in the intermediate range, (H¤1 ;H
¤
2 )=(1;F20).)
As long as (F10;F20) is located at the left side of the two loci, group 2’s average skill and wage levels
relative to group 1 fall at ﬁrst. However, if F20 is suﬃciently high, they start to rise at some point and both
groups become totally skilled eventually. Otherwise, the relative levels continue to fall and, if F20 is low, the
two groups are totally segregated by skill levels in the long run. The initial condition aﬀects the long-run
fate of the subordinate group through reputation: good (bad) reputation begets good (bad) reputation.
5.1.2 When disadvantages of the subordinate group are severe
Next consider an economy where institutionalized disadvantages of the subordinate group are severe enough
(or the relative productivity of the primary sector is low enough) that Au2 < 1 < As2 holds, i.e. un-
skilled workers of the group are less productive (net of the disutility of work) in the sector. Then,
psi = pu1 = 1 (i = 1; 2), while pu2 = 0 for s2 · (1¡Au2)huAs2hs¡Au2hu , pu2 =
s2As2hs+(1¡s2)Au2hu¡hu
(1¡Au2)hu
F2
1¡F2 2 (0;1) for
s22
¡ (1¡Au2)hu
As2hs¡Au2hu ;
1
F2
(1¡Au2)hu
As2hs¡Au2hu
¢
, and pu2=1 for higher s2 from Proposition 1. Unlike the previous econ-
omy, sectoral choices of unskilled workers of group 2 are not socially optimal when pu2>0. The boundary
between pu2=0 and pu22(0;1) and the one between pu22(0;1) and pu2=1 are given respectively by:
s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
= (1¡Au2)huAs2hs¡Au2hu ; (20)
s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
F2=
(1¡Au2)hu
As2hs¡Au2hu : (21)
Assumptions related to the dynamics of F1t and F2t are same as the previous case except that (1¡
s(0))As2hs+s(0)Au2hu< ch°b is strengthened to hu+(1¡s(0))(As2hs¡Au2hu)< ch°b (and Au2hu<
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch
now follows from Assumption 3). Thus, b¤(wu2) = ch and b¤(ws2) = ch when pu2 = 1 are given by (18) and
(19), respectively. When pu22(0;1), b¤(ws2)=ch equals
hu+
£
1¡s¡ F2N2F1N1+F2N2¢¤(As2hs¡Au2hu)= ch°b ; (22)
which is obtained by substituting (8) into (17) (with < replaced by =).25
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of F1t, F2t, and pu2t graphically. On the (F1;F2) plane, the dividing
25b¤(ws2)=ch when pu22(0;1) exists since the LHS of (22) is strictly higher (lower) than the RHS at lowest (highest) s2, i.e.
at s2 satisfying (20) (s2=s(0)), from As2hs>
ch
°b
and hu+(1¡s(0))(As2hs¡Au2hu)< ch°b .
19
Figure 4: Dynamics when Hit =Fit always and group 2’s disadvantages are severe
line between pu2 = 0 and pu2 2 (0;1) is a positively-sloped straight line that is located above the 450 line
and approaches the origin (pu2 = 0 at F2 = 0). The dividing line between pu2 2 (0;1) and pu2 = 1 is a
negatively-sloped curve, because the LHS of (21) depends positively on s2F2, like the LHS of the equation
for b¤(wu2)= ch; (18).26 The two lines are located at the left side of b¤(wu2)= ch (from Assumption 3) and
intersect at F2=1. b¤(ws2)=ch when pu22(0;1) is a positively-sloped straight line approaching the origin.27
The dynamics of F1t and F2t are as in the previous case: when F20 is large [small] enough that b¤(wu2)>
ch[b¤(ws2)<ch] at (F1;F2) = (1;F20), F2t starts to increase [decrease] eventually and (F ¤1 ;F
¤
2 ) = (H
¤
1 ;H
¤
2 ) =
(1;1)[=(1;0)] in the long run.
What is new is that sectoral choices by unskilled workers of the subordinate group change over time.
Suppose F10 is small enough that pu20=0; i.e. they choose the secondary sector initially: Then, as long as
pu2t = 0 is satisﬁed, group 2’s wages equal human capital levels and are constant. After F1t and thus s2t
become high enough that pu2t 2 (0;1) holds, induced by the growth of s2t, more and more of the group’s
unskilled workers choose the primary sector over time despite such choice is ineﬃcient, i.e. Au2< 1. This
deteriorates their reputation and, together with the increasing importance of reputation (an increase in
s2t), lowers the skilled wage of the group, while the unskilled wage remains constant at hu. That is, average
earnings of the subordinate group fall (note Au2<1).
26Since s
  N2
N1+N2

>
(1¡Au2)hu
As2hs¡Au2hu , i.e. pu2 > 0 on
F2
F1
= 1 and pu2 = 1 at (F1;F2) = (1;1), from

1¡s  N2
N1+N2

Au2hu+
s
  N2
N1+N2

As2hs>
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch and Assumption 3, the dividing line between pu2=0 and pu2 2 (0;1) is above the 450 line and
the one between pu22(0;1) and pu2=1 exists and intersects with the 450 line (and with F2=1).
27Unlike the ﬁgure, b¤(ws2)=ch when pu22(0;1) may be located above the 450 line or it may not intersect with the dividing
line between pu22(0;1) and pu2=1, although main results are not aﬀected.
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After that, the dynamics of pu2t and the wages diﬀer greatly depending on the initial condition. When
F20 is suﬃciently high, pu2t=1 is realized at some point and wage dynamics become qualitatively same as
the previous economy. The labor market is integrated in the long run in the sense that all individuals work
in the primary sector. By contrast, when F20 is small, the skilled wage of group 2 falls to the point that
b¤(ws2t)< ch and F2t starts to decrease at some point. The fall of F2t, like the growth of F1t, raises s2t,
but it also worsens the group’s reputation directly. While the positive eﬀect on s2t is stronger, pu2t rises
as before, but eventually the negative eﬀect dominates and pu2t starts to fall. In the long run, all of the
subordinate group are unskilled and in the secondary sector, thus the labor market is segregated completely
by ethnicity. Ineﬃcient sectoral choices of the group’s unskilled workers make the outcome sensitive to
the initial condition and quite diﬀerent from a ”prejudice-free” economy: if their choices are optimal, i.e.
pu2t=0, F2t is constant as under s2t=0.
5.1.3 When there are no institutionalized disadvantages
Finally, consider an economy where the majority (group 1) and the minority (group 2) exist, none of whom
face institutionalized disadvantages, i.e. N1>N2 and Ak1=Ak2´Ak (k=u; s). Au>1 is assumed so that
psi = pui = 1 (i= 1; 2) holds from Proposition 1. As for the dynamics of Fit, suppose that Ak is not very
high and thus the same assumptions as the ones for the subordinate group in the ﬁrst economy (Figure 3)
hold. Then, b¤(wui) = ch and b¤(wsi) = ch exist and are given by (18) and (19) with Ak1 =Ak2 =Ak. This
economy may be seen as an approximation to an economy where both institutionalized disadvantages of the
subordinate group and advantages of the dominant group are small.
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics of F1t and F2t. Since N1 > N2 and thus s1 < s2; the region with
b¤(wu1)>ch (b¤(ws1)<ch) is smaller than the region with b¤(wu2)>ch (b¤(ws2)<ch). Unlike Figures 3 and 4,£
1¡s¡ N1N1+N2¢¤Ashs+s¡ N1N1+N2¢Auhu< cs°b is assumed and thus b¤(wsi)=cs intersects with the 450 line.28
Now, the long-run fate of the groups depends on both F10 and F20. When (F10;F20) is above b¤(wu1)=ch
(b¤(wu2) = ch), F1t (F2t) increases over time and H¤1 =1(H
¤
2 =1) in the long run. Particularly, when both
F10 and F20 are high, i.e. when b¤(wui)>ch at (F1;F2)= (F10;F20) for at least one group i and, for j 6= i,
b¤(wuj)>ch at Fi=1 and Fj=Fj0, everyone is skilled in the long run. By contrast, when (F10;F20) is at the
left side of b¤(ws1)=ch (below b¤(ws2)=ch), F1t (F2t) decreases over time and H¤1 =0 (H
¤
2 =0). In particular,
when (F10;F20) satisﬁes both b¤(ws1)<ch and b¤(ws2)<ch, it is possible that nobody is skilled in the long
run: a bad impression that each group has about the other group aﬀects the skilled wage negatively, thus
Fit decreases and the impression deteriorates further. (In the area with chained lines, both F1t and F2t are
28A minor assumption, b¤(wsi) = ch and b¤(wuj) = ch (i 6= j) do not intersect, too is imposed. When F2 is high (low);
b¤(wu2)=ch is located at the left (right) side of b¤(wu1)=ch from Assumption 4.
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Figure 5: Dynamics when Hit =Fit always and no institutionalized disadvantages exist
constant.) Long-run outcomes tend to be more sensitive to the initial conditions for the minority since their
earnings are aﬀected more by prejudice and reputation.
5.1.4 Summary and discussions
Analyses have shown that the dynamics and long-run outcomes of groups, particularly of the subordinate
group, depend greatly on groups’ initial conditions and could be quite diﬀerent from a ”prejudice-free”
economy. Since good (bad) reputation tends to beget good (bad) reputation, a group starting with a good
(bad) initial condition, i.e. a high (low) fraction of them can aﬀord skill investment initially, tend to be in a
good (bad) condition in the long run. In the ﬁrst economy, if the initial condition of the subordinate group
is good (bad), all of them are skilled (unskilled) in the long run. In the second economy, if the condition
is good (bad), not only all of them are skilled (unskilled) but also are in the primary (secondary) sector,
hence the labor market becomes ethnically integrated (segregated) eventually. In the third economy where
institutionalized disadvantages do not exist, the dynamics and long-run outcomes of groups, particularly of
the minority, tend to be aﬀected greatly by initial conditions. The strong dependence on initial conditions
arises because, unlike a ”prejudice-free” economy in which the dynamics of an individual lineage are aﬀected
only by its initial condition, they are aﬀected by initial conditions of the groups too owing to the dependence
of primary-sector wages on group-level variables, reputation and the degree of prejudice.
Empirical ﬁndings support the strong dependence of economic outcomes of groups on their initial condi-
tions: for example, Borjas (1994) ﬁnds that wages of a U.S. worker in 1940 and 1980 are signiﬁcantly related
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to the average wage of immigrants of the worker’s ethnic group in 1910 (blacks are not in the data), after
individual characteristics are controlled for.
Note that the main implication that long-run outcomes of groups, particularly of the group whose
earnings are aﬀected more by prejudice and reputation, depend greatly on groups’ initial conditions remains
unchanged even if Ak1=Ak2 (k=u; s) holds, although the dynamics are aﬀected. That is, the implication
holds even when neither group face disadvantages in production, suﬀer greater disutility of work, or face
non-statistical discrimination in the primary sector. Ak1 >Ak2 is assumed in the ﬁrst two economies for
analytical simplicity as well as for reality: when Ak1=Ak2, as in Figure 5, critical loci exist for both groups
and thus analyses become complicated. The same is true for implications of later analyses.
5.2 When skill investment is not always proﬁtable
Section 5.1 has examined the case in which Hi =Fi always holds. Now consider the case in which Hi =0
holds at least for one group (and equilibria are stable). From Proposition 1 (ii) (see Figure 2 too), this is
true when hs¡(1+r)ch<hu and, for such group i, Aui¸ 1 and s(0)+ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu > 1. This is the case in
which skill investment is unproductive in the secondary sector, and the investment is not very productive
in the primary sector (at least for one group) or the maximum degree of prejudice is high.
Investment decisions of the two groups are interrelated, thus, depending on Asi and Aui, equilibrium
combinations of H1 and H2 are varied and multiple equilibria are possible. To limit possible combinations,
the following is assumed.
Assumption 5 When Ak1 ¸ Ak2 (k=u; s); As1hs¡Au1hu¸As2hs¡Au2hu:
It states that the social return to investment in the primary sector is weakly higher for the dominant
group, which would be reasonable because the subordinate group tend to have greater disadvantages in jobs
requiring high interpersonal skills usually occupied by skilled workers (e.g. management jobs). The next
proposition presents equilibrium (H1;H2) based on Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium (H1;H2) when the investment is not always proﬁtable) Assume hs¡
(1+r)ch<hu, Ak1 ¸ Ak2¸1 (k=u; s), and s(0)+ (1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu >1.
(i) If (1¡s(0))[As1hs¡Au1hu]¸ (1+r)ch, H1=F1 and both H2=F2 and H2=0 are equilibria (H2=0 is the
equilibrium) when s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
<(¸) 1¡ (1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu .
(ii) Otherwise, (H1;H2)= (0;F2); (F1;0); and, when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+FjNj
¢
< 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu for any i; j=1; 2 (j 6= i),
(H1;H2)=(F1;F2) as well.
Multiple equilibria exist unless s(0)+ (1+r)chAs1hs¡Au1hu ·1 and s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
+ (1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu ¸ 1.
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Figure 6: Dynamics when H2t=F2t is selected in the region where both H2t=0 and H2t=F2t are equilibria
5.2.1 When investment is always proﬁtable for the dominant group
If the investment is always (weakly) proﬁtable for the dominant group, i.e. (Au1;As1) is in the region on
or above As1 = huhsAu1+
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs (and Au1 ¸ 1) in Figure 2 (Proposition 2 (i)), H1 = F1 is always true,
while both H2=F2 and H2=0 are equilibria (H2=0 is the equilibrium) when F2N2F2N2+F1N1 is strictly greater
(smaller) than the value satisfying
s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
=1¡ (1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu : (23)
As explained after Lemma 2, multiple equilibria arise due to strategic complementarity within the subordinate
group: as more of them invest in skill and become skilled workers, s2 decreases and the investment becomes
more proﬁtable. As for sectoral choices, since Aui¸1, psi=1 and pui=1 (i=1; 2) from Proposition 1.
Suppose that disadvantages of the subordinate group are not so severe (or the relative productivity of the
primary sector is not so low) and advantages of the dominant group are not so small that assumptions related
to the dynamics of F1t and F2t are same as the ﬁrst economy in Section 5.1 (thus F1t always increases),
except that (1¡s(0))As2hs+s(0)Au2hu< ch°b now follows from Au2hu<
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch. When multiple equilibria
exist, assume that the initial coordination among the subordinate group continues for subsequent periods:
for example, ifH20=F20 happens to hold, thenH2t=F2t for any t>0. This assumption would be reasonable
considering that children tend to mimic parental behaviors in real society.29
29Relatedly, in a dynamic model of statistical discrimination, Kim and Loury (2009) assume that, when there exist equilibrium
paths to both good and bad steady states, an initial consensus on the ﬁnal state shared by group members picks one path and
the consensus is maintained over generations.
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Then, if s
¡
F2 0N2
F1 0N1+F2 0N2
¢
< 1¡ (1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu , i.e. both H20=F2 and H20=0 are equilibria, and H20=0
happens to be realized initially, the subordinate group never make productive investment, F1t rises and F2t
falls (since H2t=0 and Au2hu<
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch) over time, and H¤1 =F
¤
1 =1 and H
¤
2 =F
¤
2 =0.
Otherwise (thus H20=F20 if s
¡
F2 0N2
F1 0N1+F2 0N2
¢
<1¡ (1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu ), the dynamics are as illustrated in Figure
6. The dividing line between H2=F2 and H2=0 (eq. 23) is a positively-sloped straight line approaching
the origin, and H2=0 holds below the line. The dynamics of F2t when H2t=F2t are qualitatively same as
the ﬁrst economy of Section 5.1 (Figure 3), while when H2t=0, F2t decreases over time.
Hence, if F20 is not so small that b¤(ws2)¸ch at (F1;F2)=(1;F20), given the initial condition, the long-run
fate of the subordinate group is drastically diﬀerent depending on which equilibrium happens to be realized
initially: if H20 = F20, H¤2 = 1 (if b
¤(wu2) > ch at (F1;F2) = (1;F20)) or H¤2 = F20 (otherwise), whereas if
H20=0, H¤2 =F
¤
2 =0.
30 The initial selection of good (bad) equilibrium brings the better (worse) long-run
outcome than under si=0.
5.2.2 When investment is not always proﬁtable for both groups
If the investment is not always proﬁtable for the dominant group too, i.e. (Au1;As1) is in the region between
As1 = huhsAu1+
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs and the line for Assumption 1 (ii) in Figure 2 (Proposition 2 (i)), equilibria are
(H1;H2) = (0;F2); (F1;0); and, when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+FjNj
¢
< 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu for any i; j, (H1;H2) = (F1;F2) too.
(psi = pui = 1.) (H1;H2) = (0;F2); (F1;0) are equilibria since strategic substitutability is at work between
the groups: as more individuals of one group invest, prejudice toward the other group intensiﬁes and their
return to investment falls. As in the previous economy, assumptions related to the dynamics of Fit are same
as the ﬁrst economy in Section 5.1, and the initial coordination is maintained when multiple equilibria exist.
Then, if only the subordinate (dominant) group happen to make productive investment initially, i.e.
H10=0 and H20=F20 (H10=F10 and H20=0), F2t is constant (falls) and F1t rises and H¤1 =0 (H
¤
1 =1)
and H¤2 = F20 (H
¤
2 = 0). Since this type of equilibria exist for any F10 and F20, it is possible that the
dominant group with a much better initial condition than the subordinate group, i.e. F10>>F20, end up
with the smaller fraction of skilled workers, i.e. H¤1 = 0 < H
¤
2 = F20 (F
¤
1 = 1 > F
¤
2 = F20, though). If
s
¡
Fi0Ni
Fi0Ni+Fj0Nj
¢
<1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu for any i; j=1; 2 and (H10;H20)=(F10; F20) happens to hold, the dynamics
are similar to those illustrated in Figure 6.31 Unlike the previous economy, the long-run outcome of the
30When Au2<1 and s(0) +
(1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu > 1 (the case not considered in the proposition or Corollary 1, see Figure 2), the
dynamics are illustrated by a ﬁgure similar to Figure 6. Diﬀerences are that no stable equilibria exist, not H2=0, in the region
on or below s
  F2N2
F1N1+F2N2

=1 ¡ (1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu , and in the region above the line, pu2<1 is possible depending on F1 and F2
like Figure 4. Hence, if s
  F20N2
F10N1+F20N2

<1 ¡ (1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu and s
  F20N2
N1+F20N2
 ¸1 ¡ (1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu , F1t rises and Hit = Fit
(i=1; 2) at ﬁrst, but after the economy crosses the line, the stable equilibrium fails to exist.
31Diﬀerences are that another positively-sloped straight line, s
  F1N1
F1N1+F2N2

= 1 ¡ (1+r)ch
As1hs¡Au1hu , exists above the 45
0 line,
and equilibrium (H1;H2) = (F1;F2) exists only in the region between this line and s
  F2N2
F1N1+F2N2

= 1 ¡ (1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu (the
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dominant group too is sensitive to the initial selection of equilibrium given the initial condition.
5.2.3 Summary and discussions
To summarize, when skill investment is unproductive in the secondary sector, and the investment’s produc-
tivity in the primary sector is low or the degree of prejudice is high, multiple equilibria could exist regarding
skill investment, and given the initial distribution of wealth, the initial selection of equilibrium could aﬀect
the dynamics greatly. When the investment is proﬁtable for the dominant group, it can be the case that,
if the subordinate group with enough wealth happen to (not to) invest initially, F2t increases (decreases)
over time and all of the group are skilled (unskilled) in the long run. When the investment is not proﬁtable
with high si for the dominant group too, given the initial condition, the long-run outcome of the dominant
group too is sensitive to the initial selection of equilibrium. The dominant group with a much better initial
condition than the subordinate group could end up with the smaller fraction of skilled workers, if the former
(latter) group happen not to (to) invest initially. As can been shown easily, a similar result holds for the
majority and the minority when there are no institutionalized disadvantages, i.e. Ak1=Ak2 (k=u; s).
The results suggest that, in an economy where prejudice is severe (s(0) is high) or the eﬀectiveness of
skill investment is low, if the initial selection is aﬀected by institutionalized discrimination against a group
that limits their access to investment opportunities, such discrimination could have a lasting impact on their
well-beings well after its abolishment. Income or wealth redistribution raising Fi does little to change the
situation, while aﬃrmative action treating them favorably in skill investment, such as a tuition subsidy, could
be very eﬀective. To be successful, their ch must be lowered so that, for any group, (1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]¸
(1+r)ch holds and thus Hi=Fi becomes the unique equilibrium (Corollary 1). The redistribution becomes
eﬀective only after such policy is implemented.
6 General case
So far Assumption 1 (iii), Asi¸ huhsAui+ hs¡hu(1¡s(0))hs , s(0)+ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu ·1; is imposed. This condition does
not hold when s(0) is high or the relative eﬀectiveness of skill investment in the primary sector, Asihs¡Auihuhs¡hu ,
is low. So this is dropped now. Under the assumption, the net return to choosing the primary sector is weakly
higher for skilled workers even when the degree of prejudice is severest (si=s(0)) and thus psi¸pui always
holds. Without it, it is possible that psi=0 and pui=1 hold, i.e. all skilled workers choose the secondary
sector and all unskilled workers choose the primary sector, even if the former have comparative advantages
dotted bold line). The economy is in this region and F1t increases at ﬁrst. If s
  F20N2
N1+F20N2
¸1 ¡ (1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu , the economy
crosses the dotted bold line eventually, after which the equilibrium switches to (H1t;H2t)=(0;F2t) or (F1t;0). If a group with
smaller Fit switches to Hit =0, as in the ﬁgure, F2t continues to decline and H
¤
2 =F
¤
2 =0 and H
¤
1 =1 in the long run.
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and are more productive in the primary sector. This result may explain the fact that skilled people of
subordinate groups often avoid primary-sector jobs and run small businesses instead. Further, multiple
equilibria could exist regarding sectoral choices of skilled workers as well as skill investment. Hence, the
initial selection of equilibrium on the sectoral choices too could have lasting impacts on the dynamics.
6.1 Sectoral choices and skill investment
To analyze the model without Assumption 1 (iii), this subsection examines sectoral choices and skill invest-
ment when the assumption does not hold. Assumption 1 (iii) is replaced by:
Assumption 6 s(0)+ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu >1, Asi< huhsAui+ hs¡hu(1¡s(0))hs :
As in Section 3.1, Assumptions 3 through 5 are not imposed in this subsection.
The following lemma on sectoral choices is parallel to Lemma 1 under the old assumption.
Lemma 3 (Sectoral choices under Assumption 6) Suppose Hi>0 and psjHj>0, j 6= i.
(i) When Aui¸ 1, pui=1. psi=1 if s(0)· (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu ; both psi=1 and psi=0 if s(0)>
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu and
s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ; otherwise, psi=0.
(ii) When Aui<1,
(a) If (1¡si)Asihs¡hs>(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi=1 ,si=s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu , psi=1 and
pui is determined as in Lemma 1 (ii).
(b) Otherwise, psi=pui=1 if s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , or else, no stable equilibrium exists.
When Aui¸1, unskilled workers always choose the primary sector as before, while choices of skilled work-
ers now depend on the net return to the primary sector: if it is positive with psi=1, i.e. s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , psi=1 as before, whereas if it is negative with psi=0, i.e. s(0)>
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu , psi=0.
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That is, when s(0) is suﬃciently high, all skilled workers choose the secondary sector and all unskilled workers
choose the primary sector, even if the former have comparative advantages and are more productive in the
primary sector. Since s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<s(0), both psi=1 and psi=0 are equilibria for some combinations
of Asi and Aui due to strategic complementarity among skilled workers (their net return increases with psi).
When Aui < 1 and the net return to the primary sector at psi = 1 is weakly lower for skilled workers, i.e.
s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu , if the return for the skilled (at psi=pui=1) is positive, psi=pui=1 holds,
otherwise (thus psi< 1), no stable equilibrium exists: psi=0 cannot be an equilibrium from Asi> 1>Aui,
while an equilibrium with psi 2 (0;1) is not stable due to strategic complementarity. (Choices are same as
the corresponding case of Lemma 1 when Aui<1 and the net return at psi=1 is higher for the skilled.)
The next lemma corresponding to Lemma 2 under the old assumption presents equilibrium values of Hi:
32An equilibrium with psi2 (0;1) is not stable because the net return for the skilled increases with psi.
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Lemma 4 (Skill investment under Assumption 6) Suppose Fi>0.
(i) When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu; Hi=Fi if psjHj=0 for j 6= i. If psjHj>0,
(a) When Aui¸1,
1: If hs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu, Hi=Fi.
2: If hs¡(1+r)ch<Auihu, Hi=Fi when s(0)·1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu ; both Hi=Fi and Hi=0 are equilibria when
s(0)>1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu >s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
; or else, Hi=0.
(b) When Aui<1, if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<min
©
max
£ (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu);1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu
¤
; 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu
ª
, Hi=
Fi, otherwise, no stable equilibrium exists.
(ii) When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, Lemma 2 (ii) applies (except case s(0)·1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu does not exist).
When hs¡(1+r)ch ¸ hu, Hi = Fi always under the old assumption, while ineﬃcient Hi = 0 can be an
equilibrium and stable equilibria may not exist under the new assumption. When Aui¸ 1, psi=0 or 1 and
pui = 1 from Lemma 3 (i). Hence, if the net return to investment is non-negative even under psi = 0 and
pui = 1 (the return is lower than under psi = pui = 1), i.e. hs¡(1+r)ch ¸Auihu, Hi = Fi holds; otherwise,
when the net return with Hi=0 is negative even under psi= pui=1, Hi=0 holds, while when the return
with Hi=Fi is positive under psi=pui=1, Hi=Fi holds (and both Hi=0 and Hi=Fi are equilibria when
both conditions hold due to strategic complementarity). When Aui< 1, no stable equilibria exist if stable
psi and pui do not exist or if stable Hi does not exist (otherwise, Hi = Fi). Stable Hi fails to exist when
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸ 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu since the net return under Hi=0 is higher than under Hi> 0 after the
dependence of pui on Hi is taken into account: given Hi =0, pui =0 from Aui < 1 and thus Hi =0 is not
an equilibrium from Asihs¡(1+r)ch>hu (Assumption 1 (ii)), whereas, given Hi2 (0; Fi], the net return is
non-positive from s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸ 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu and thus Hi2(0; Fi] is not a stable equilibrium.33
Finally, investment and sectoral choices of group i for given choices by the other group under Assumption
6 are summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 (Investment and sectoral choices of group i under Assumption 6)
(i) When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu, if psjHj=0 for j 6= i, Hi=Fi; psi=1; and Proposition 1 (i)(b) applies for pui.
If psjHj>0,
(a) When Aui¸1, pui=1.
1: When hs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu, Hi=Fi. psi=1 if s(0)· (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu ; otherwise, both psi=1 and psi=0
are equilibria if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ; or else psi=0.
2: When hs¡(1+r)ch < Auihu, psi = 1: If s(0) · 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , Hi = Fi; otherwise, both Hi = 0 and
Hi=Fi are equilibria if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , or else Hi=0.
33Note that pui> 0 must hold from s
  FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¸ 1¡ (1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu >
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , Lemma 3 (ii), and Lemma 1 (ii),
and psi=1 must hold from Lemma 3 (ii).
28
Figure 7: Investment and sectoral choices under Assumption 6 when hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu and psjHj>0 (j 6= i)
(b) When Aui<1,
1: If s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi, psi=1, and Proposition 1 (i)(a) applies for pui.
2: Otherwise, if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<min
© (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;1¡
(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
ª
, Hi =Fi and psi = pui =1; or
else, no stable equilibrium exists.
(ii) When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, Proposition 1 (ii) applies (no case s(0)·1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu ).
Figure 7 shows the choices when hs¡(1+r)ch ¸ hu and psjHj > 0 (j 6= i). Although the ﬁgure looks
complicated, the choices when Aui >
hs¡(1+r)ch
hu
are same as when hs¡ (1+r)ch < hu and Aui ¸ 1 under
Assumption 1 (iii) illustrated in Figure 2, and the ones when Aui<1 are similar to the corresponding case
of Figure 2 (conditions determining the region of no stable equilibria are diﬀerent, though). What is really
new is when Aui 2
h
1; hs¡(1+r)chhu
i
; in which Hi=Fi, pui=1, and, depending on Asi and Aui, psi=0, both
psi = 0 and psi = 1, or psi = 1 (choices of skilled workers are ineﬃcient when psi = 0). The choices when
hs¡(1+r)ch<hu are almost same as the corresponding case under Assumption 1 (iii) of Figure 2.34
34The only diﬀerence is that, when Aui¸1, the region in which Hi=Fi is the unique equilibrium does not exist. Note that
Hi=Fi is possible under Assumption 6 too: unlike Figure 2, if hs¡ (1¡s(0))(1+r)cs<hu holds, the line dividing the regions
satisfying Assumption 1 (iii) and Assumption 6 is located above the line for Assumption 1 (ii) in Figure 2.
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6.2 Analyses
The dynamics are examined without imposing Assumption 1 (iii). Qualitatively new dynamics arise when
Aui2
£
1;hs¡(1+r)chhu
¤
(thus hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu) and s(0)> (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu (thus Assumption 6) hold for at least one
group i (the region below the upper dashed double-dotted line in Figure 7), and either Auj¸1 or Assumption
1 (iii) holds for the other group j.35 This is the case in which skill investment is socially productive, s(0) is
high, and Aui is at an intermediate level for at least one group i.
Consider an economy in which the former set of conditions hold for the subordinate group (group 2),
and either Au1 >
hs¡(1+r)ch
hu
and As1 ¸ huhsAu1+
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs or Au1 ¸ 1 and Assumption 1 (iii) hold for the
dominant group (group 1). Hi=Fi and pui=1 for i=1; 2, and ps1=1, while ps2 is 0 or 1 from Figures 7
and 1. The dividing line between the region ps2=0; 1 and the region ps2=0 is, from Proposition 3 (i)(a)1.:
s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
(1¡F2)= (As2¡1)hsAs2hs¡Au2hu : (24)
Suppose that disadvantages of the subordinate group are moderate enough (or the relative productivity of
the primary sector is high enough) and advantages of the dominant group are large enough that assumptions
on the dynamics are same as the ﬁrst economy in Section 5.1, implying that F1t increases and, when ps2=1,
b¤(ws2)=ch (eq. 19) and b¤(wu2)=ch (eq. 18) exist. Further, assume hs< ch°b and thus F2t falls when ps2t=0.
When multiple equilibria exist, initial coordination continues for subsequent periods as in Section 5.2.
Then, if s
¡
F2 0N2
F1 0N1+F2 0N2
¢
(1¡F20)< (As2¡1)hsAs2hs¡Au2hu holds, i.e. both ps20=0 and ps20=1 are equilibria, and
ps20=0 happens to be realized, F1t rises and F2t falls over time and H¤1 =1 and H
¤
2 =0. Although skilled
workers of the subordinate group are more productive in the primary sector, they choose the secondary
sector to avoid the negative eﬀect from their fellow unskilled workers. The sector’s wage, however, is not
high enough for their descendants to remain skilled and the group are totally unskilled in the long run.
Instead, if ps20=1 happens to be realized under the same situation, the dynamics of F1t and F2t are as
illustrated in Figure 8.36The skilled workers eﬃciently choose the primary sector and earn the higher wage
than the previous case. In particular, if F20 is high enough that b¤(wu2)>ch at (F1;F2)=(1;F20), F2t starts
to rise at some point and H¤1 =H
¤
2 = 1 in the long run. The group’s unskilled workers beneﬁt from the
presence of the skilled workers in the primary sector, enabling the upward mobility of their descendants.
Given the initial condition, the long-run fate of the subordinate group diﬀers greatly depending on the
35The dynamics are similar to Section 5 in other cases. When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, analyses of the corresponding case in Section
5 go through. When hs¡(1+r)ch ¸ hu, if either Aui ¸ 1 and s(0)· (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu (the region on or above the upper dashed
double-dotted line in Figure 7) or Aui>
hs¡(1+r)ch
hu
is true for any i, analyses in Section 5 apply, while when Assumption 6 and
Aui < 1 hold for some i and thus stable equilibria fail to exist depending on Fi, analyses in footnote 30 of Section 5.2 apply.
36From (24), the dividing line (the dashed line) is positively sloped and approaches the origin (note s(0)>
(As2¡1)hs
As2hs¡Au2hu ).
(F1 0; F2 0) is above the line since ps2=1 is possible only in the region above it. Shapes of b¤(ws2)=ch and b¤(wu2)=ch are as
explained in Section 5.
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Figure 8: Dynamics when ps2t=1 is selected in the region where both ps2t=0 and ps2t=1 are equilibria
initial selection of equilibrium on sectoral choices by the group’s skilled workers. The same is true for the
dominant group too when Aui 2
£
1;hs¡(1+r)chhu
¤
and s(0) > (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu hold for both groups. The result
suggests that initial institutionalized discrimination against a group limiting their access to skilled jobs in
the primary sector could have a lasting negative impact on their well-beings well after its abolishment. This
is consistent with the ﬁnding by Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey (2001) that the occupational status of a U.S.
worker in 1980 and 1990 is signiﬁcantly related to human capital endowments and the degree of favorable or
unfavorable treatment in the labor market in the period between 1880 and 1910 of his/her group. Aﬃrmative
action treating them favorably in the sector, such as a wage subsidy to the sector’s (particularly skilled)
jobs that makes psi=1 the unique equilibrium, could be very eﬀective to change the situation.37
7 Conclusions
Disparities in economic conditions among diﬀerent ethnic, racial, or religious groups continue to be serious
concerns in most economies. Relative standings of diﬀerent groups are rather persistent, although some
groups initially in disadvantaged positions successfully caught up with then-advantaged groups. Two obsta-
cles, costly skill investment and negative stereotypes or discrimination in the labor market, seem to distort
investment and sectoral decisions and slow down the progress of the disadvantaged.
This paper has developed a dynamic model of statistical discrimination in which these obstacles aﬀect skill
37A wage subsidy to all primary-sector jobs could lower incentives for skill investment and result in Hi =0, if the subsidy
is too generous. A subsidy targeting skilled workers can be implemented, if workers’ skill levels are revealed eventually (see
footnote 18 for an interpretation of the wage function consistent with this).
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investment and sectoral choices of individuals of two groups and examined how initial economic standings of
the groups and initial institutionalized discrimination aﬀect subsequent dynamics and long-run outcomes.
The model economy has (up to) two sectors, the primary sector that is ethnically mixed and group reputation
aﬀects wages due to statistical discrimination, and the secondary sector with the contrasting features.
Main results are summarized as follows. First, sectoral choices and skill investment may not be socially
optimal since choices of diﬀerent individuals within and across groups could be interrelated. Second, multiple
equilibria could exist regarding investment and sectoral choices of skilled workers: both the non-poor of a
group invest (skilled workers choose the primary sector) and do not could be equilibria. Third, the dynamics
and long-run outcomes of groups, particularly of the subordinate group, depend greatly on initial conditions
and could be quite diﬀerent from a ”prejudice-free” economy. Since good (bad) reputation tends to beget
good (bad) reputation, a group starting with a good (bad) initial condition tend to be in a good (bad)
position in the long run. Fourth, when multiple equilibria exist, which is the case when the eﬀect of
stereotypes is strong or the eﬃcacy of investment is low, given initial conditions, the initial selection of
equilibrium could aﬀect the dynamics and long-run outcomes greatly. If the initial selection is determined
by institutionalized discrimination limiting a group’s access to investment or skilled jobs in the primary
sector, the discrimination could have a lasting impact on their welfare well after its abolishment. Income or
wealth redistribution does little to change the situation, while aﬃrmative action could have a large impact.
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Appendix Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) If psi>0, psi=pui=1 is the only stable equilibrium because
(1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs¸(1¡s(0))Asihs+s(0)E[Akihk]¡hs (25)
¸(1¡s(0))Auihu+s(0)E[Akihk]¡hu (26)
¸(1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu (27)
> [(1¡si)Aui¡1]hu+siAuihu=(Aui¡1)hu¸0, (28)
where the second inequality is from Assumption 1(iii) and the fourth inequality is from psi> 0. If psi=0,
pui=0 must hold from (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs¸(1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu. However, psi= pui=0
is not an equilibrium from Asi>1 (skilled workers deviate).
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(ii) As shown in (i), (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs¸(1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu. Thus, if psi=0, pui=0 must
hold, which is not an equilibrium, as shown in (i). If psi2(0;1), (27) holds with> and pui=0 must hold, which
is not an equilibrium from Asi>1. Thus, if an equilibrium exists, psi=1 and the net return to the primary
sector for the unskilled is (1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu=[(1¡si)Aui¡1]hu+si HiAsihs+pui(1¡Hi)AuihuHi+pui(1¡Hi) , which
decreases with pui. Hence, pui=0 if the return is non-positive with pui=0, i.e. si· (1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu ; pui=1 if it is
non-negative with pui=1, i.e. [(1¡si)Aui¡1]hu+si[HiAsihs+(1¡Hi)Auihu]¸0,si¸ 1Hi
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ; otherwise,
pui2(0;1) and pui is determined from the zero return condition. Such pui and psi=1 is an equilibrium when
pui=0 from Asi>1 and when pui>0 from (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs>(1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu. If
pui=0 (=1) and the return for the unskilled is negative (positive), the equilibrium is stable since the one
for the skilled is positive. Otherwise, it is stable since the return for the skilled is positive and the one for
the unskilled decreases with pui.
Proof of Lemma 2. Hi=Fi when psjHj=0 for j 6= i is obvious from Assumption 1 (ii).
(Existence/nonexistence of Hi>0 when psjHj>0) (i) Given Hi>0, psi=1 from Lemma 1. Thus, when
pui>0, (1¡si)[Asihs¡Auihu]¡(1+r)ch>(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]¡(1+r)ch¸hs¡hu¡(1+r)ch¸0 from Assumption
1 (iii) (thus phi = 1). When pui = 0, since Asi > 1, (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡(1+r)ch =Asihs¡(1+r)ch >
hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu. Hence, Hi=phiFi=Fi is the only equilibrium with Hi>0, which is clearly stable.
(ii) Given Hi>0, psi=1 from Lemma 1 and si=s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
. When pui=0, i.e. s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢·
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu from Lemma 1 (ii) (occurs only in (b)), Asihs¡(1+r)ch ¸ hu (from Assumption 1 (ii)) and
thus phi = 1 from Assumption 2. When pui > 0, i.e. s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
> (1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu , the net return is£
1¡s¡ HiNiHiNi+psjHjNj¢¤(Asihs¡Auihu)¡(1+r)ch and phi=1(=0) if s¡ HiNiHiNi+psjHjNj¢·(>)Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu from
Assumption 2. Note Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu ¸
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu from Asihs¡(1+r)ch¸hu. Hence, if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
>
1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , the net return is negative for any Hi2(0; Fi] and no equilibrium with Hi>0 exists, while if
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi is the only stable equilibrium with Hi>0 since the return increases
with Hi (if s(0)> 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , an equilibrium with Hi 2 (0; Fi) exists but is not stable). Similarly, if
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
=1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi is the only equilibrium with Hi>0 but is not stable.
(Existence/nonexistence of Hi=0 when psjHj>0) Given Hi=0, if Aui<1, the net return is Asihs¡(1+
r)ch¡hu¸0 and Hi=0 is not an equilibrium (when the net return is 0, phi=1 from Assumption 2). Given
Hi=0, if Aui¸1, the net return is max[(1¡si)Asihs+siAuihu; hs]¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu=maxf(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡
Auihu]; hs¡Auihug¡(1+r)ch=(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu] ¡(1+r)ch¸hs¡hu¡(1+r)ch from Assumption 1 (iii)
and Aui¸1. Thus, in (i), Hi=0 is not an equilibrium when Aui¸1 too (note Assumption 2). In (ii), the net
return is negative (non-negative) when s(0)>(·)1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu . Hence, Hi=0 is (is not) an equilibrium if
s(0)>(·)1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu in (ii)(a). Equilibrium Hi=0 is stable in (ii)(a) since s(0)>1¡
(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu implies
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a negative net return with small Hi>0 (since Aui¸1, given Hi>0, psi=pui=1 from Lemma 1 (i)).
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Hi=Fi from Lemma 2 (i), thus Lemma 1 applies with Hi=Fi. (ii)(a)/(b)
The value of Hi is from Lemma 2 (ii)(a)/(b).
Proof of Proposition 2. When (1¡s(0))[As2hs¡Au2hu]¸(1+r)ch, the same condition holds for group 1 from
Assumption 5, which is the case covered in Section 5.1. When Au2<1 and (1¡s(0))[As2hs¡Au2hu]<(1+r)ch,
given ps1H1 > 0, stable H2 does not exist for some F2 from Proposition 1 (ii)(b). Given ps1H1 =H1 = 0,
H2 = F2 from the proposition, but (H1;H2) = (0;F2) is an equilibrium for any F1 and F2 only if Au1 ¸ 1,
(1¡s(0))[As1hs¡Au1hu]<(1+r)c (see Figure 2), and H1=0 happens to hold (H1=F1 too could hold depending
on F1 and F2) from Assumption 5 and Proposition 1 (ii)(a). Equilibria that are stable for any F1 and F2
may not exist and thus this case is not considered in the proposition (brieﬂy discussed in footnote 30).
psi=1 when Hi>0 (i=1; 2) from Proposition 1 (ii). Then, from Proposition 1 (ii)(a), given ps1H1=H1=
0, H2=F2, and given H1>0, both H2=F2 and H2=0 (H2=0) when s
¡
F2N2
F2N2+H1N1
¢
<(¸) 1¡ (1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu .
(i) In this case, from Proposition 1 (ii)(a), H1=F1 always. Hence, H1=F1 and both H2=F2 and H2=0
are equilibria (H2=0 is the equilibrium) when s
¡
F2N2
F2N2+F1N1
¢
<(¸) 1¡ (1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu . (ii) Given H2; the value
of H1 is determined in the same way as H2. Hence, (H1;H2) = (0;F2); (F1;0); and, when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+FjNj
¢
<
1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu for any i; j=1; 2 (j 6= i), (H1;H2)=(F1;F2) as well.
Proof of Lemma 3. An equilibrium with psi 2 (0;1) and pui = 1, if exists, is not stable, because the
return to the primary sector for the skilled becomes positive whenever psi increases. An equilibrium with
psi 2 (0;1) and pui = 0 does not exist from Asi > 1. An equilibrium with psi; pui 2 (0;1), which satisﬁes
(1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs=(1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu=0, is not stable because, whenever psi increases
and pui non-increases, the return for the skilled becomes positive and psi does not have a tendency to return
to the original value: the eﬀect of psi on the return for the skilled is greater than for the unskilled from
Asihs>Auihu and the eﬀect of pui on the return is same for both types of workers.
Thus, if a stable equilibrium exists, psi=0 or 1. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1 (i), psi=pui=0 is
not an equilibrium. psi=0 and pui 2 (0;1) is not an equilibrium when Aui 6=1, while it is not stable when
Aui=1 (since the return for the unskilled becomes positive whenever psi increases). psi=0 and pui=1 is
not an equilibrium when Aui < 1. When Aui ¸ 1, it is a stable equilibrium if the return for the skilled is
negative, i.e. (1¡s(0))Asihs+s(0)Auihu¡hs<0, s(0)> (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu , because the return for the unskilled
is positive (when Aui>1) or it increases whenever psi increases (when Aui=1). (When s(0)=
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu ,
it is not stable since the returns for the skilled increases with psi.)
As for possible equilibria with psi=1, if (1¡si)Asihs¡hs>(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi=1, s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , the proof of Lemma 1 (i) and (ii) can be applied with a slight modiﬁcation, thus the result
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of the lemma holds. If (1¡si)Asihs¡hs·(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi=1, psi·pui and thus pui=1 must hold. psi=
pui=1 is a stable equilibrium when (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs=(1¡si)Asihs+si[HiAsihs+(1¡Hi)Auihu]¡hs>0
with psi = 1 , s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , since the returns for both types are positive. When
s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
= (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , it is not stable because the return for the skilled falls with a decrease
in psi. (When (1¡si)Asihs¡hs=(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi=1, the additional reason is that the eﬀect of psi
on the return for the skilled is greater than for the unskilled and the eﬀect of pui on the returns are same.)
To summarize, when Aui ¸ 1, pui = 1; and since (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ¸
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , psi = 1 if
s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) and psi=0 if s(0)>
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu . Hence, because s(0)>
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu
(from Assumption 6), (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu ·
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , and s(0)> s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
hold, the stable equi-
librium(a) is psi = pui = 1 when s(0) · (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu ; both psi = pui = 1 and psi = 0; pui = 1 when
s(0)> (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu and s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ; and psi=0 and pui=1 otherwise.
When Aui<1, if s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu , the result of Lemma 1 (ii) applies, otherwise, the
stable equilibrium is psi=pui=1 (no stable equilibrium exists) if s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<(¸) (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) .
Proof of Lemma 4. (Proof when psjHj=0 for j 6= i) The proof of Lemma 2 applies.
(Existence/nonexistence of Hi>0 when psjHj>0)
(i) If (1¡si)Asihs¡hs > (1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi =1 and Hi =Fi; and psi =1 for given Hi =Fi hold,
i.e. s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< 1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu (from Lemma 3 (i) and (ii)), the corresponding part of Lemma 2
(i) applies and thus Hi = Fi is the only stable equilibrium with Hi > 0.38 Instead, if (1¡si)Asihs¡hs ·
(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi = 1 and Hi = Fi and psi = 1 for given Hi = Fi hold, i.e. s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢ 2£(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ;
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu)
¢
(from Lemma 3 (i) and (ii)), psi = pui = 1 from the lemma and the
net return to investment with Hi = Fi equals
£
1¡s¡ FiNiFiNi+psjHjNj¢¤(Asihs¡Auihu)¡(1+r)ch. Hence, if the
return is positive, i.e. if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi is the only stable equilibrium with Hi>0,
otherwise, no stable equilibrium with Hi>0 exists. (If the return is positive, an equilibrium with Hi2(0; Fi)
too may exist, and if it is zero, Hi=Fi is the only equilibrium with Hi> 0, both of which are not stable.)
Finally, when Aui¸1, if psi=0 for Hi=Fi holds, i.e. s(0)> (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu (from Lemma 3 (i)), the net return
is hs¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu, thus, if it is non-negative, Hi=Fi is the only stable equilibrium with Hi> 0 (note
Assumption 2), otherwise, no stable equilibrium with Hi>0 exists.
To summarize, when Aui¸1, Hi=Fi if hs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu and s(0)> (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu or if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<
min
© (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
ª
. Note that, when hs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu, (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu ·
38To be exact, if s(0)>
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu , for given Fi, there exists
eHi2(0; Fi) such that s  eHiNieHiNi+psjHjNj= (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu(1¡ eHi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ,
and when Aui ¸ 1, psi = 0 and pui = 1 is the only equilibrium for Hi 2 (0; eHi]. However, such Hi (phi 2 (0; 1)) is not an
equilibrium since the net return is hs¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu (note Assumption 2). The same reasoning applies to the next case and
the corresponding cases of (ii) too.
37
min
© (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
ª
and thus Hi = Fi always. Hence, when Aui ¸ 1, Hi = Fi if
hs¡(1+r)ch ¸Auihu or if hs¡(1+r)ch <Auihu and s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu . When Aui < 1, if
1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu ¸
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , Hi = Fi when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< 1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu ; otherwise, Hi = Fi
when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<min
© (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;1¡
(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
ª
.
(ii) If (1¡si)Asihs¡hs > (1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi = 1 and Hi = Fi and psi = 1 for Hi = Fi hold, i.e.
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu holds (see the proof of (i)), the corresponding part of the proof of Lemma
2 (ii) applies. In particular, since 1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu < 1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi is a stable equilibrium in the
same cases as Lemma 2 (ii), except that now s(0)·1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu is not possible from Assumption 6. No
equilibrium with Hi>0 exists in the remaining cases: if (1¡si)Asihs¡hs·(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi=1 and
Hi=Fi and psi=1 hold, pui=1 and the net return is (1¡si)[Asihs¡Auihu]¡(1+r)ch·hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu<0;
and when Aui¸1, if psi=0 , pui=1 and the net return is hs¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu·hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu<0.
(Existence/nonexistence of Hi = 0 when psjHj > 0) Given Hi = 0, if Aui < 1 (thus pui = 0), the
corresponding part of the proof of Lemma 2 applies and thus Hi=0 is not an equilibrium in (i)(b) and when
Aui<1 in (ii). Given Hi=0, if Aui¸1, the net return is maxf(1¡si)Asihs+siAuihu; hsg¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu=
maxf(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]; hs¡Auihug¡(1+r)ch<hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu. Thus, Hi=0 is always an equilibrium when
Aui¸1 in (ii), while it is (is not) an equilibrium if maxf(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]; hs¡Auihug¡(1+r)ch <(¸)0
in (i)(a). That is, Hi=0 if (1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]<hs¡Auihu , s(0)> (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu and hs¡(1+r)ch<
Auihu; or if s(0)· (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu and s(0)>
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu . Since
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu >
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu ,
hs¡(1+r)ch<Auihu, Hi=0 if hs¡(1+r)ch<Auihu and s(0)> Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu in (i)(a).
Proof of Proposition 3. (When psjHj=0 for j 6= i) Since Hi, psi, and pui are determined independent of
s(¢), the corresponding result of Proposition 1 applies.
(When psjHj > 0) (i)(a)1 From Lemmas 4 (i)(a)1 and 3 (i). (a)2 From Lemmas 4 (i)(a)2 and 3 (i).
Note that psi = 1 when Hi = Fi, since, if psi = 0, Hi = 0 from hs¡ (1+ r)ch¡Auihu < 0. (b)1 From
Lemmas 4 (i)(b) and 3 (ii)(a) and Proposition 1 (i)(a). (b)2 From Lemmas 4 (i)(b) and 3 (ii)(b). (Since
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu , max£ (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu¤= (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) .)
(ii) Hi is determined as in Lemma 4 (ii). When Hi = 0, psi and pui are determined independent of
s(¢) and Proposition 1 applies. When Hi = Fi, from Lemma 4 (ii) and Lemma 2 (ii), s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu . Hence, when Aui ¸ 1, psi = pui = 1 from Lemma 3 (i), since s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu <
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu and Hi=0 holds if psi=0. When Aui<1, from Lemma 3 (ii)(a), psi and
pui are determined as in Lemma 1 (ii) from s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<1¡ (1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu <1¡ hs¡huAsihs¡Auihu .
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